Movement occupies a position of remarkable conceptual density within the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as a physiological fact, a phenomenological datum, a metaphysical category, and a therapeutic resource. The range of treatment is correspondingly vast. At one pole, Merleau-Ponty insists that movement is not a derivative phenomenon but the very medium through which the lived body constitutes its world, arguing that genuine perception of movement cannot be separated from its apprehension as meaningful. McGilchrist, drawing on Bergson, Hegel, and contemporary neuroscience, radicalises this claim: movement is ontologically foundational, and stillness is merely its limit-case, never a prior condition from which motion departs. Buzsáki’s enactivist position — that perception is grounded in motion, not the reverse — echoes this priority. In the clinical register, Ogden demonstrates how traumatic experience inscribes itself as movement restriction, showing that habitual postural and motor patterns encode relational history. Koch’s embodiment framework makes explicit the bidirectionality between motor activity and affect-cognition. Aristotle and Plotinus supply the ancient architecture: the former taxonomising movement into locomotion, alteration, decay, and growth; the latter distinguishing motion from the objects moved. The Shaiva tradition introduces the paradox of the ‘movement-less movement’ — spanda — a pulsation without vikalpa. Across all these registers, the central tension is between movement as analysable sequence and movement as irreducible living process.