The term ‘vow’ occupies a complex position within the depth-psychology library, appearing at the intersection of Indo-European linguistics, comparative religion, yogic ethics, and therapeutic spirituality. Benveniste’s philological analyses provide the most sustained treatment, tracing the vow through Greek eúkhomai and Latin votum as a binding speech-act — simultaneously a consecration, a contractual obligation with the divine, and an assertion of selfhood before witnesses. The vow is not mere wish or prayer; it is a performative utterance that places the devotee’s very person as collateral, creating an anticipatory gift-exchange with transcendent powers. Burkert extends this into Greek religious practice, where the vow is structurally embedded within sacrifice and prayer, functioning as a public declaration before gods and community alike. In yogic and Buddhist contexts, the vow transforms into the mahāvrata of Patañjali — an absolute, universal ethical commitment — and the Bodhisattva vow of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which reorients the self toward the liberation of all sentient beings. Shaw’s biblical-therapeutic reading applies the Nazirite vow as a clinical model for substance abstinence. Across these traditions, the vow consistently functions as a technology of self-binding: a structure by which the psyche anchors itself to a purpose greater than immediate desire, at the cost of foregoing revocation.
the person ‘vowed,’ although he still remains in the land of the living, is acquired in advance by the divinity: ‘to vow’ is a consecration and one in the most stringent form.
Benveniste establishes the vow as a form of anticipatory consecration, a binding of the living person to the deity through a rigorously formalized sequence of enunciation, formulation, reception, and fulfillment.
, Indo European Language and Society, 1973thesis
this term ‘vow’ has an ambiguous meaning. There are two different senses, as we can see in the use of the Latin terms votum, voveo. On the one hand a vow is made to perform some action; on the other a vow is expressed.
Benveniste identifies a fundamental semantic duality in the vow — as solemn promise-to-act versus as declaration of wish or desire — grounded in the Greek eúkhesthai and its Latin counterparts.
, Indo European Language and Society, 1973thesis
in battle a warrior makes one ‘vow’ and only one: that is to win a victory. For a warrior, to grant him his ‘vow’ is to give him victory.
Benveniste demonstrates that eúkhos, typically translated as ‘glory’ or ‘victory,’ is properly understood as ‘vow,’ the singular ambition consecrated before the gods in the context of combat.
, Indo European Language and Society, 1973thesis
This complex is found in all the examples of the Homeric formula hṑs éphat’ eukhómenos: an actual offering, which is anticipated, but always as a quid pro quo for something which is expected. Thus the sense ‘prayer’ is too vague, and in all cases it should be defined more precisely as a ‘vow.’
Benveniste argues that the Homeric formula for prayer is more precisely a vow — a conditional reciprocal offering — distinguishing vow structurally from mere supplication.
, Indo European Language and Society, 1973thesis
Patañjali states that the yamas are absolute and universal for aspiring yogīs — they cannot be transgressed or exempted under any circumstance such as class, jāti; place, deśa; time, kāla; or circumstance, samaya. They are nonnegotiable for yogīs.
Bryant shows that Patañjali elevates the yamas to the status of mahāvrata — a great vow that admits no class, temporal, geographic, or circumstantial exemption — making the vow the supreme ethical foundation of yoga.
, The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali: A New Edition, Translation, and Commentary, 2009thesis
a vow is a decision to keep the commandments, confirmed by a promise on the part of the person making the vow; and a prayer is a petition by one who has kept the commandments that he may be transformed by the commandments he has kept.
The Philokalia distinguishes vow from prayer by positioning the vow as an antecedent commitment to virtue, while prayer is the reward or fruit of that virtue — the vow thus initiates the spiritual contest.
, The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting
Usually the prayer includes within it the vow — which is likewise called euche; so it is made officially and before witnesses. The gods, of course, can also hear soft entreaties.
Burkert situates the vow within public Greek religious practice as an officially witnessed speech-act embedded within prayer and sacrifice, structurally distinct from private petition.
, Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical, 1977supporting
THE BODHISATTVA VOW In early Buddhism, the Pali term bodhisatta meant someone who is intent (satta) upon enlightenment (bodhi) … A bodhisattva, then, is a wisdom being, as well as a wisdom seeker.
Brazier presents the Bodhisattva vow as a Mahāyāna reformulation of the vow-structure, in which the commitment to enlightenment is simultaneously a declaration of present wisdom-being and future attainment.
, Zen Therapy: Transcending the Sorrows of the Human Mind, 1995supporting
For a Christian substance abuser, at least initially, it is a very good idea to think of yourself as taking a Nazirite vow regarding intoxicating drugs and alcohol.
Shaw transposes the biblical Nazirite vow into a therapeutic context, proposing it as a model of radical self-consecration that externalizes and sanctifies the commitment to sobriety.
, The Heart of Addiction: A Biblical Perspective, 2008supporting
There is a special observance or vow (vrata) that accompanies this magic ritual, and this must be kept by the one who performs it.
Zimmer identifies the vrata in Vedic magical practice as a complementary observance that makes ritual efficacy possible, binding the practitioner’s behavior to the success of the rite.
, Philosophies of India, 1951supporting
the turbaned queen — so runs another tale — longing to greet the sage, her husband’s brother, bade farewell to the king, her husband, and at eventide took the following vow: ‘At early morn, accompanied by my retinue, I will greet the sage Soma and provide him with food and drink; only then will I eat.’
Zimmer illustrates through narrative the dharmic vow as a self-imposed ethical constraint that structures action in relation to sacred obligation, interwoven with Indic conceptions of right conduct.
, Philosophies of India, 1951supporting
The god has not strictly to ‘fulfill’ this wish; he does not execute it himself. He may accept the vow, and only this divine sanction enables this wish to be realized.
Benveniste clarifies that divine acceptance — not execution — is the operative mechanism of the vow’s efficacy, emphasizing the sanction-granting function of the deity in Homeric theology.
, Indo European Language and Society, 1973aside