The term ‘presentation’ (phantasia in Greek; Vorstellung in the German philosophical tradition; Gegenwärtigung in phenomenology) occupies a structurally pivotal position across several registers of the depth-psychology corpus. In Stoic moral psychology, as elaborated by Inwood and corroborated by the ancient sources preserved in Cicero and John of Damascus, presentation names the initiating moment in any sequence of mental events leading to action: it is the percept that arises in the hegemonikon and to which rational assent is either granted or withheld. The ethical weight of the concept turns entirely on this juncture between stimulus and response — a point of no small consequence for theories of impulse, responsibility, and the sage’s invulnerability to passion. Thompson and phenomenological psychology sharpen the distinction between presentational experience (Gegenwärtigung), in which the object is given in its very being, and re-presentational experience (Vergegenwärtigung), in which it is given as phenomenally absent and mentally evoked — a distinction that maps directly onto perception versus memory and imagination. Berry, citing Jung, extends this into depth-psychological territory: every psychic process observable as such is essentially theoria, that is, a presentation, and its analytic reconstruction is at best a variant of the same presentation. Together these traditions reveal ‘presentation’ as the hinge between world and psyche, between appearing and knowing, between impulse and freedom.