Within the depth-psychology corpus, ‘impulse’ (Greek: hormē) occupies a position of unusual theoretical density, functioning simultaneously as a physiological fact, a volitional event, and a moral category. The dominant treatment derives from Stoic philosophy, where impulse is neither a blind drive nor a mere reflex but the proximate cause of rational action — a mental assent to a motivating appearance that is always, in principle, within the agent’s governance. Inwood’s reconstruction of early Stoicism insists on this point against reductive readings: hormē is not instinctual pressure building from within, but a disposition that regulates selective response to stimuli. Graver extends this by showing that even emotional impulses are formed through rational judgment, though momentum can carry them past a counter-impulse. Sorabji clarifies the identity of impulse with assent — specifically assent to an appearance of what is appropriate to act upon. The Stoic corpus also elaborates a rich taxonomy: rational vs. irrational impulse, practical impulse, orexis, orousis, and specialized subspecies such as boulēsis and prohairesis. Outside the Stoic frame, Rank’s depth-psychological account treats impulse as the raw material of the will, with emotion figured as a dammed or inhibited impulse and will as an ego-impulse actively placed in the service of the self. Rank’s tension with impulse reveals the field’s broader concern: whether subpersonal drives or rational assents ultimately govern human conduct.
A hormē, which I am translating by the term of art ‘impulse’, is not just an instinct or an underlying drive in an animal. This is worth insisting on at the outset, since the recognition of this is hard won and still not universally accepted.
Inwood establishes the foundational Stoic claim that impulse is a rational, volitional event and not a brute instinct or drive, correcting widespread scholarly misreading.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985thesis
impulse is at least sometimes equated with assent (sunkatathesis). In other words, it is just another case of assent on the part of reason, but assent to an appearance about how it is appropriate (kathēkon) to act.
Sorabji identifies impulse with rational assent to a motivating appearance of appropriate action, revealing its deep integration with Stoic volitionalism.
, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000thesis
assent if given does cause impulse and impulse does cause action. This line of reasoning is confirmed by other evidence.
Inwood establishes the Chrysippean causal chain from external stimulus through assent to impulse to action, making impulse the pivotal mechanism linking judgment and behavior.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985thesis
every impulse we form is formed in the way characteristic of rational creatures, through a judgment of what is to be done. But even so there will be some moments when an impulse seems involuntary and when considerations of one’s own best interests are helpless
Graver argues that all human impulses are constitutively rational in their formation, yet acknowledges the phenomenon of momentum by which an impulse can override a subsequent counter-impulse.
, Stoicism and Emotion, 2007thesis
The main type of impulse is rational impulse, which is also called ‘practical impulse’. This kind of impulse, we have seen, is the one that matters most for ethics. For it is the general designation for all the impulses of rational animals, which are the proper cause of responsible actions.
Inwood presents the Stoic taxonomy of impulse, identifying rational or practical impulse as the ethically decisive category and the proper cause of responsible human action.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985thesis
emotions are voluntary (perturbationes voluntarias esse) is equivalent to saying that emotion events are in our power precisely because they are also assents, judgments with a certain content.
Graver shows that the Stoic claim of voluntariness for emotions rests on the identity of emotional impulse with assent, making all hormai — including passions — expressions of rational agency.
, Stoicism and Emotion, 2007thesis
the hormetic disposition is an innate plan which regulates selective response to stimuli. The drive to act does not build up and push the animal from within into action. The Stoics thought of the disposition as something which governed responses to stimuli when they occurred and as simply lying dormant, doing nothing, when not stimulated.
Inwood distinguishes the Stoic hormetic disposition from Freudian drive-models, characterizing it as a latent regulatory plan activated by stimuli rather than a pressuring internal force.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985thesis
The soul has three movements - impression, impulse and assent. The movement of impression we could not remove, even if we wanted to; rather, as soon as we encounter things, we get an impression and are affected by them.
The Hellenistic doxographic tradition presents impulse as one of three fundamental soul-movements, distinct from impression and assent, though dynamically interrelated with both.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
Chrysippus did not think that the magnitude of a impulse varied according to the degree to which a thing is good. The reaction to something which is erroneously judged to be good is an attraction to it in excess of what is natural.
Inwood clarifies that passionate or excessive impulse for Chrysippus results from a qualitative error of judgment rather than from quantitative misjudgment of degree of goodness.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
appetite and anger and fear and all such things are corrupt opinions and judgements, which do not arise about just one part of the soul but are the whole commanding-faculty’s inclinations, yieldings, assents and impulses, and, quite generally, activities which change rapidly
The Stoic account renders passions as whole-soul phenomena — impulses and assents of the commanding-faculty — rather than products of a sub-rational faculty, unifying psychology under rational agency.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
the relationship between the impulse and the assent is such that it is a matter of relative indifference whether one identifies them or treats the impulse as the result of the assent. They are both mental events; they always occur together, since assent is the cause of the impulse
Inwood resolves the Zeno–Chrysippus dispute about passion by showing that impulse and assent are co-occurring mental events, making their identification or sequential ordering a terminological rather than substantive difference.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
epibolē is an impulse before an impulse; paraskeuē is an action before an action; encheir-ēsis is an impulse in the case of something already in hand; boulēsis is a rational [i.e. correct] orexis; thel-ēsis is a voluntary boulēsis.
Inwood presents the Stoic sub-taxonomy of practical impulse, revealing a highly differentiated structure that distinguishes preparatory, anticipatory, and fully engaged forms of volitional movement.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
the commanding-faculty combines in the same body impression, assent, impulse, reason.
Iamblichus’ doxography situates impulse as one of four qualitatively distinct but co-substrate functions of the Stoic commanding-faculty, establishing its place within a unified rational psychology.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
All actions in the proper sense of the word are the result of assent as well as of impulse, and assent is just the sort of thing for which a man may be held to account.
Inwood draws out the moral-responsibility implications of the assent–impulse nexus: because every genuine action requires both, and assent is the agent’s own, full accountability is preserved.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
an illness in the soul is ‘a very strong (vehementem) opinion concerning a thing which is not to be chosen . . . as though it were to be chosen strongly (valde)’. Cicero’s text is virtually a translation of what we read in Arius Didymus.
Inwood uses Cicero and Seneca to show that excessive impulse is defined by an erroneous intensity of evaluation, not by a departure from rationality per se.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
his ‘natural impulse’ to perform such actions is consistently shaped by his moral outlook, which has taught him that he has a pre-ordained role to play in the world, and that his value system gives him the means of adapting himself freely and harmoniously to everything
Long and Sedley show that for the Stoic sage, natural impulse is not suppressed but shaped and ordered by a secured moral outlook, harmonizing instinct and reason.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
An orousis must be, on this hypothesis, an impulse to an action which is more remote in the future, not to be performed in the immediate situation in which the agent finds himself. It would, then, be an appropriate form of impulse to use when one wanted to speak of planning and long-range intentions.
Inwood distinguishes orousis as a future-directed impulse suited to planning and long-range intention, extending the Stoic account of impulse beyond immediate action to encompass deliberate agency.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
The perception of a beautiful person elicits an impulse towards friendly behaviour (A); but this impulse is, in the circumstances, closely connected to future behaviour which is more appropriate to the sexual connotations of the word erōs (B).
Inwood illustrates how impulse can have an implicit forward-referencing structure, connecting present volitional events to anticipated future actions and their moral entailments.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
Chrysippus (and probably Zeno too) did not have a detailed theory about the gradual evolution of humans. When they spoke about ‘primary impulse’ or the ‘primary natural things’, they did not have in mind a distinct form of impulse and specific behaviour patterns which are characteristic of newborn animals only.
Inwood corrects the assumption that Stoic ‘primary impulse’ designates an infantile or pre-rational form, arguing it applies generally to the oikeiōsis framework of any rational agent.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
The will is an impulse, positively, actively placed in the service of the ego, and not a blocked impulse, as is the emotion. Later Rank referred to the will as an ‘ego impulse.’
Rank’s depth-psychological framework distinguishes will from emotion by positioning will as an active, ego-directed impulse, in contrast to emotion as dammed or inhibited impulse-energy.
, Existential Psychotherapy, 1980supporting
the creative impulse in the artist, springing from the tendency to immortalize himself, is so powerful that he is always seeking to protect himself against the transient experience, which eats up his ego.
Rank characterizes the creative impulse as a drive toward self-immortalization that actually supersedes and defensively overrides lived experience, giving it a structuring role in artistic personality.
, Art and Artist: Creative Urge and Personality Development, 1932supporting
The smooth flow of life is possible and this is the freedom which the wise man alone enjoys. It is the inevitable result of a complete consistency with himself and with the will of Zeus.
Inwood situates the regulation of impulse within the broader Stoic ethical ideal of a life lived in consistent conformity with rational nature and providential order.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985aside