Phrenes — the plural form of phren — occupies a central and contested position in early Greek psychological vocabulary, and its treatment across the depth-psychology corpus reveals a term that resists reduction to any single faculty. Sullivan’s meticulous philological survey establishes phrenes as a somatic-psychic composite located in the chest region, functioning as an instrument of deliberation, speech, and emotional processing that remains, in most contexts, subordinate to the person who employs it. Padel, approaching the same textual archive through the lens of tragic imagery, foregrounds phrenes as the seat of receptor passivity — an organ upon which emotions act, through which speech is generated, and into which external words violently intrude — while also noting its capacity for active, initiating force in later tragedy. Jaynes situates the statistical rise in phrenes usage from the Iliad to the Odyssey as evidence of an emerging subjective interiority, a passive, visual mode of cognition displacing the active surge of thumos. Carson reads phrenes as physiologically cognate with the lungs, and therefore with breath, consciousness, and eros. The key tensions in the corpus concern: whether phrenes is primarily a cognitive or affective organ; whether it is passive receptor or active agent; and how it maps onto the co-present psychic entities noos and thumos. As Sullivan shows, phrenes and noos are consistently distinct — phrenes offering practical deliberation while noos supplies inner vision of truth — a distinction that proves fundamental to understanding early Greek accounts of mind.