The Seba library treats Kradie in 9 passages, across 2 authors (including Sullivan, Shirley Darcus, Julian Jaynes).
kradie (or kardie), etor, and ker. These psychic entities have a strongly physical aspect as the 'heart' within, endowing life by its activity. But each also is associated with a range of emotional functions.
Sullivan establishes kradie as one of three Homeric 'heart' terms that are simultaneously somatic organs and seats of emotional-psychological life, setting the taxonomic frame for all subsequent discussion.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995thesis
A coward in the Iliad is not someone who is afraid, but someone whose kradie beats loudly (13:282). The only remedy is for Athene to 'put' strength in the kradie (2:452), or for Apollo to 'put' boldness in it (21:547).
Jaynes reads kradie as a somatic anxiety-sensor whose container-metaphor — divine strength deposited into the heart — generates the proto-subjective mind-space foundational to his bicameral hypothesis.
, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, 1976thesis
A variety of Greek terms indicates the presence of this activity: noos, phren, thumos, kradie, etor, ker, and prapis. No simple term appears to express what we might mean by 'personality' or 'self'.
Sullivan positions kradie within the full system of early Greek psychic terms, arguing that psychological activity in archaic literature is distributed across distinct entities rather than unified in a single self.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995thesis
Kradie 14–17, 41 n. 56, 58, 70–3 (esp. 70 n. 121, 72 n. 127), 75, 76, 78, 87, 90, 229–31
The index entry for kradie in Sullivan's monograph documents the term's sustained presence across Homer, the lyric poets, and the elegiac tradition, confirming its broad textual distribution.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
Kradw (or kardia in Pindar and Bacchylides) is found… Like kradw, etor is involved in several emotions: joy, grief, anger, fear, and pain.
Sullivan traces kradie's emotional range into the lyric and elegiac poets, noting its Pindaric and Bacchylidean form kardia and showing the term's expanding affective register beyond Homer.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
people speak to their thumos. This does not occur with noos or phren but is found with kradie.
Sullivan distinguishes kradie from other psychic entities by noting that, like thumos, it can be addressed in direct speech, marking a degree of quasi-personal agency unique among the 'heart' terms.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
'Psychic' suggests a range of psychological functions. 'Entities' points to the presence in the person of distinct seats of psychological activity.
Sullivan justifies her methodological category of 'psychic entities,' the conceptual framework under which kradie and its cognates are analyzed throughout the study.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
Saying that the internal sensations of large circulatory and muscular changes are a thing into which strength can be put is to generate an imagined 'space,' here located always in the chest, which is the forerunner of the mind-space of contemporary consciousness.
Jaynes argues that container-metaphors applied to chest-located organs like kradie constitute the first structural building-blocks of subjective interiority in the Greek tradition.
, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, 1976supporting
Noos may be what puts humans on a continuum with the divine and what makes them what they are. Of all the psychic entities, it…
Sullivan's comparative evaluation of noos provides contrastive context for kradie's more somatic and emotional profile, implicitly defining the range within which heart-terms operate.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995aside