Metriopatheia

Metriopatheia — the moderation of the passions rather than their extirpation — occupies a contested but structurally indispensable position across the philosophical and theological literature surveyed in the depth-psychology corpus. The term names an ideal intermediate between Stoic apatheia (freedom from emotion) and the unreflective surrender to passion, and its fortunes track the larger debate between Hellenistic philosophy and emerging Christian anthropology. Richard Sorabji’s extensive treatment in Emotion and Peace of Mind establishes the term’s Peripatetic and Platonist roots — Crantor and Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean are its ancestral voices — while documenting its migration through Philo of Alexandria, the Cappadocian Fathers, Plotinus, and Augustine. A central tension runs through all engagements: whether metriopatheia is a final ideal for ordinary human beings or merely a pedagogical stepping-stone toward the higher apatheia available to sages or saints. Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Nemesius of Emesa each position these ideals as appropriate to different persons or stages; Plotinus treats them as hierarchically ordered; Augustine, in a pivotal reversal, abandons his early Stoicizing acceptance of apatheia and becomes metriopatheia’s foremost Latin champion. Martha Nussbaum’s index entry cross-references the concept under ‘Moderate affect,’ signalling its relevance to Hellenistic therapeutic ethics more broadly. The term thus functions as a hinge between ancient eudaimonism and Christian moral psychology.

In the library 13 passages

neither to toss about beyond measure (metrion) as if at an entirely novel and spontaneous disaster, nor to be emotionless (apatheia), as if nothing painful had happened, but to choose the mean (to meson) rather than the extremes (akra), and try to be moderate in emotion (metriopathein).

Philo’s formulation presents metriopatheia as a deliberate middle path between unrestrained grief and emotionless indifference, grounded in the Aristotelian logic of the mean.

Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000thesis

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The misrepresentation is part of his case for metriopatheia 397–8; Exceptions to metriopatheia: some emotions always bad: Pride 335–7; Lust 336–7.

Augustine’s polemical reframing of Stoic apatheia as mere emotional stupor serves rhetorically to clear ground for his positive advocacy of metriopatheia, though he carves out exceptions for intrinsically vicious emotions.

Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000thesis

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Christian consoling enjoins metriopatheia usually 391–2, 393–5; But Gregory of Nyssa represents Macrina as enjoying apatheia 392–3; Seneca, through believing in apatheia, enjoins on Marcia only metriopatheia 394.

In consolation literature, metriopatheia functions as the standard practical counsel regardless of the consoler’s own theoretical commitment to apatheia, revealing a pragmatic gap between philosophical ideal and pastoral application.

Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000supporting

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Augustine drew attention to the ambiguity of freedom from emotion as between a mere stupor, as he puts it, and a freedom from disturbing emotions that oppose reason, like fear and grief, as opposed to love and gladness.

Augustine’s critique of apatheia’s ambiguity — whether it means beneficial emotional regulation or mere insensibility — is foundational to his case that metriopatheia, not apatheia, constitutes the authentic Christian moral standard.

Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000supporting

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metriopatheia. See Moderate affect … Moderate affect, 287–90.

Nussbaum’s index cross-references metriopatheia with the concept of moderate affect, situating it within Hellenistic therapeutic ethics and directing the reader to substantive discussion of the doctrine as a philosophical ideal distinct from full extirpation of passion.

Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994supporting

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