Ataraxia — the Greek term denoting freedom from mental disturbance, anxiety, and inner perturbation — occupies a structurally pivotal position in the depth-psychology corpus, functioning principally as a horizon concept against which therapeutic ambition is measured. The Hellenistic schools furnish the term's primary theoretical articulations: in Epicurus, ataraxia names a privative but positive state, the stable pleasure of a mind liberated from unsatisfied desire and from the bodily correlate aponia; it is emphatically distinguished from kinetic pleasure and valorized for its duration and stability. In Pyrrhonian Scepticism, ataraxia functions paradoxically as both the announced goal and a tacit dogmatic commitment that Sextus Empiricus — and his later reader Nussbaum — cannot fully dissolve: the Sceptic's therapeutic machinery is organized around producing ataraxia, yet acknowledging that organization as intentional would constitute the very dogmatism Scepticism disavows. Nussbaum's sustained scrutiny of this self-undermining logic represents the most philosophically penetrating treatment in the corpus. Sorabji catalogues ataraxia alongside apatheia and metriopatheia as competing Hellenistic models for emotional management, tracing their divergent commitments to reason, nature, and the passions. Sharpe and Ure situate the term within the broader project of philosophy as a way of life, noting how its privative grammar — absence of anxiety, absence of pain — shaped ancient spiritual exercises. The central tension animating the corpus is whether ataraxia constitutes a genuine psychological achievement or a concealed suppression of vitality — a tension that resonates, without naming the term, in depth-psychological critiques of numbing, resignation, and the evacuation of desire.
In the library
12 passages
These are ataraxia, first, the absence of anxiety, worry or inner distress and aponia, the absence of physical pain. Usener 2 hence claims that 'freedom from trouble in the mind [ataraxia] and from pain in the body [aponia] are static pleasures.'
This passage provides the canonical Epicurean definition of ataraxia as the privative, stable pleasure of a mind free from distress, pairing it with aponia as the dual foundation of Epicurean happiness.
Sharpe, Matthew and Ure, Michael, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021thesis
These are ataraxia, first, the absence of anxiety, worry or inner distress and aponia, the absence of physical pain. Usener 2 hence claims that 'freedom from trouble in the mind [ataraxia] and from pain in the body [aponia] are static pleasures.'
Duplicating Sharpe's co-authored passage, this establishes ataraxia and aponia as the two constitutive privative terms of Epicurean eudaimonia, distinguished from active kinetic pleasures.
Matthew Sharpe and Michael Ure, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021thesis
For why does the Skeptic have a Skeptical attitude to ataraxia? According to him, because he must have this attitude, if he is to avoid disturbance and attain ataraxia. We are invited, then, to press our suspicions further.
Nussbaum exposes the performative self-contradiction at the heart of Pyrrhonism: the Sceptic's official detachment from ataraxia as a goal is continuously undermined by the fact that the entire Sceptical enterprise is organized to produce it.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994thesis
Consider, too, the role played by ataraxia in ordering the whole Sceptical enterprise. Suppose the connection between equipoise and ataraxia was, as Sextus says, discovered by chance in the first place.
Nussbaum argues that ataraxia functions as the covert telos ordering Pyrrhonian practice, making the Sceptic's disavowal of committed ends philosophically untenable.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994thesis
So ataraxia is not like the other ends we go for, with the help of belief; it is just there for us as things flow along — you take away everything but nature, you get the orientation to that and no other.
Nussbaum articulates the Pyrrhonian claim that ataraxia is nature's own orientation, not a belief-dependent pursuit, exemplified by Pyrrho's pig eating calmly in a storm.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994thesis
IV. Commitment and Ataraxia. We must now confront directly the central problem with which many of these chapters have grappled: how far does the attachment of these schools to various versions of freedom from pain and disturbance
Nussbaum frames ataraxia as the focal point of a sustained cross-school inquiry into whether the Hellenistic commitment to freedom from disturbance is compatible with full human attachment and erotic engagement.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994supporting
The Skeptics clearly do jettison truth and even good reasoning, on the way to ataraxia. They cheerfully
Nussbaum charges the Sceptics with instrumentalizing reason itself — sacrificing truth and sound argument — in single-minded pursuit of ataraxia, a critique that marks the sharpest boundary between Sceptical and Stoic therapeutic ambitions.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994supporting
Epicureans: Freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) 182, 208; Selective emotion 196, 201–3; Against fear of death 236, 248–9.
Sorabji's index entry situates ataraxia within the Epicurean program of selective emotional management, linking it to therapeutic practices directed against fear of death and toward enduring mental freedom.
Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000supporting
Pyrrhonian sceptics: Apatheia for emotions 198, 224; Metriopatheia for physical pain 27–8, 198–200; Ataraxia freedom from disturbance 182; Causal interconnection of emotions 182–3.
Sorabji arrays ataraxia alongside apatheia and metriopatheia as the three competing Hellenistic normative ideals for managing disturbance, clarifying their distinct therapeutic and philosophical commitments.
Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000supporting
Arcesilaus proposed what would come to be called in Pyrrhonism the epochē or suspension of judgement as the key to wisdom: a refusal to assent.
This passage contextualizes the Pyrrhonian epochē — the suspension of judgement that precedes ataraxia — within the Academic sceptical tradition, establishing the historical lineage of the concept's therapeutic application.
Matthew Sharpe and Michael Ure, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021aside
Arcesilaus proposed what would come to be called in Pyrrhonism the epochē or suspension of judgement as the key to wisdom: a refusal to assent.
Parallel to the Ure passage, this locates the intellectual ancestry of Pyrrhonian practice — and by extension the path to ataraxia — in Academic critical scrutiny of the limits of knowledge.
Sharpe, Matthew and Ure, Michael, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021aside
The Skeptic, claims Sextus, will argue in exactly the way suited to the nature of the pupil's disease. In the fascinating section of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism entitled, 'Why the Skeptic sometimes deliberately puts forward arguments that are weak in persuasive power.'
Nussbaum describes the Sceptical therapeutic method of calibrating argumentative dosage to the pupil's particular pathology, the medical framework within which ataraxia functions as the intended cure.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994aside