Consolation occupies a distinctive and contested position across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as therapeutic technique, spiritual category, and philosophical problem. In the Stoic and post-Stoic literature surveyed by Sorabji and Graver, consolation names a specific genre of practical therapy aimed at dismantling the evaluative judgements that sustain grief; Chrysippus, Cicero, Seneca, and Epicurus each advance rival strategies—ranging from cognitive revaluation and the ‘you are not alone’ commonplace to the appeal to divine providence—with Sorabji tracking their differential efficacy with precision. Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy marks the transitional moment at which pagan therapeutic technique is absorbed into Christian metaphysics, a move Sorabji reads with careful ambivalence. In patristic and monastic sources—Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Philokalic tradition—consolation appears paradoxically: the truly penitent soul may refuse all consolation as unmerited, while the spiritual director is nonetheless obliged to offer it as a measured pastoral gift. The Beatitude ‘they shall be consoled’ (Matt. 5:4), exegeted by Gregory Palamas, grounds grief itself in divine economy, transforming consolation from psychological relief into eschatological promise. Jung, reading Nietzsche, treats consolation ironically—as the soul-denying comfort that suppresses psychological complexity. Across these traditions the unifying tension is between consolation as legitimate palliation and consolation as a spiritual or therapeutic evasion.