Within the depth-psychology and embodied-mind corpus, ‘limb’ functions less as an anatomical datum than as a nexus for investigating the relationship between bodily integrity, self-representation, and psychic identity. The term arrives with greatest theoretical force through the phenomenon of the phantom limb, which commands sustained attention from Merleau-Ponty, Gallagher, Damasio, Sacks, and Fogel. Each deploys the phantom as evidence for a constitutive claim: that the body schema or body image is not derived purely from peripheral sensation but possesses an irreducibly central — and, on some accounts, innate — organization. Merleau-Ponty reads the phantom as exposing the ontological ambiguity of embodied existence, where presence and absence resist neat categorical separation; the anosognosic and the amputee both testify to a pre-reflective investment in bodily wholeness. Gallagher pushes further, using aplasic phantoms to argue for an innate body schema antecedent to all experience. Damasio interprets phantom phenomena through dispositional representations that persist in the absence of on-line peripheral input. McGilchrist, meanwhile, situates limb-ownership disturbances — misoplegia, somatoparaphrenia, supernumerary phantoms — within hemispheric asymmetry. Across these traditions, the limb functions as the site where neuroscience, phenomenology, and depth psychology converge on questions of selfhood, loss, and the integrity of the lived body.