Anosognosia — the radical, neurologically grounded inability to acknowledge one’s own disease or deficit — occupies a peculiar and revealing position in the depth-psychology corpus. First systematically described by Babinski in 1914, the condition challenges any naively psychodynamic account of denial: Damasio insists across multiple works that the syndrome is emphatically not a motivated, adaptive psychological defense but rather the direct consequence of disrupted somatosensory self-mapping, typically following right-hemisphere stroke. For Damasio, the anosognosic patient illustrates what happens when the body can no longer supply the feeling-based signals upon which coherent self-awareness and rational decision-making depend; the result is not merely motor unawareness but a global collapse of self-modelling, forecasting, and appropriate emotional response. McGilchrist enlarges this neurological reading into a hemispheric argument: anosognosia is almost invariably a consequence of right-hemisphere damage, because it is the right hemisphere that anchors reality-testing, registers what is novel or discrepant, and inhibits the left hemisphere’s tendency toward confabulation and incorrigible self-certainty. Merleau-Ponty, from a phenomenological vantage, complicates both accounts by arguing that the anosognosic patient does in fact possess a preconscious knowledge of the deficit — the avoidance itself presupposes an intuition of what is being evaded. Craig situates anosognosia within the interoceptive architecture of the anterior insular cortex. Taken together, these voices make anosognosia a touchstone for debates about self-awareness, body image, consciousness, and the neural substrates of knowing.