Judgement occupies a peculiarly central position across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as an epistemological category, a therapeutic lever, and an archetypal event. The Stoic tradition, reconstructed most rigorously by Sorabji, treats judgement as the constitutive core of emotion: Chrysippus insists that passions are not merely accompanied by judgements but are themselves erroneous acts of rational assent, specifically the compounded judgement that something is bad and that distress is an appropriate response. The therapeutic consequence is considerable — attacking the second ‘appropriate to react’ judgement becomes the preferred instrument of consolation. Merleau-Ponty interrogates judgement from the phenomenological side, arguing that the empiricist reduction of perception to bodily impression forces an incoherent appeal to judgement as supplementary interpreter, collapsing the distinction between seeing and thinking one sees. In the Tibetan Bardo literature, mediated through Evans-Wentz, judgement becomes an eschatological drama: the Court of Judgement externalises the karmic thought-forms of the deceased, the Mirror of Memory reflecting what consciousness has made of itself. Edinger, working alchemically, reads the Judgement of Paris as an act of separatio — a forced discrimination among life-values that can constellate the Self. The Hellenistic philosophers extend the inquiry to the epistemology of assent, where suspended judgement becomes a philosophical discipline. Taken together, these voices reveal judgement as the hinge between affect and reason, between karmic record and liberation, and between mere perception and ethical self-constitution.