Hallucination occupies a peculiarly contested position in the depth-psychology corpus, situated at the intersection of psychopathology, phenomenology, altered consciousness, and the theory of perception itself. Bleuler’s clinical taxonomy in Dementia Praecox establishes the most exhaustive descriptive baseline: auditory, visual, somatic, olfactory, and gustatory hallucinations are catalogued with painstaking phenomenological precision, and their relationship to delusion, projection, autism, and affective complex is theorized with systematic rigor. Merleau-Ponty provides the most philosophically rigorous challenge to both empiricist and intellectualist accounts, arguing that hallucination and normal perception share a single primordial function—the body’s capacity to project a structured world—and that the normal subject is no less vulnerable to perceptual fiction than the psychotic. Jaynes relocates hallucination historically, treating auditory voices as the literal mechanism of the bicameral mind and schizophrenic hallucination as an atavistic remnant of a pre-conscious cognitive organization. Jung and von Franz extend the range further, treating certain hallucinations as numinous invasions of archetypal content with genuine psychological authority. Winnicott introduces the term in a developmental register, where the infant’s ‘sensory hallucination’ is the founding act of creative experience that the environment either validates or annihilates. The corpus thus refuses any single ontological verdict: hallucination is at once symptom, perception-variant, archaic cognition, developmental necessity, and portal.