Within the depth-psychology corpus, grief is recurrently theorized not as a passive endurance of loss but as a demanding and specific form of learning — a neurological, psychological, and existential process through which the organism updates its predictive models of the world, revises its attachment maps, and reorients its self-understanding. Mary-Frances O’Connor advances the most technically precise version of this claim: grief requires the brain to revise deeply encoded probabilistic expectations about where and when beloved persons will appear, a process that necessarily takes longer than ordinary learning because such expectations were built over thousands of repetitions across years of shared life. Robert Neimeyer extends the claim phenomenologically, framing bereavement as a systematic ‘relearning of the world’ — physical, social, and spiritual domains each requiring fresh encounter. Thomas Attig, quoted through Neimeyer, emphasizes that survivors may appropriate the values and sensibilities of the deceased, transforming grief’s lesson into an ongoing ethical and aesthetic inheritance. Worden’s task model implicitly encodes the same logic: each mourning task is a distinct cognitive-behavioral acquisition. The tensions within this literature concern the pacing and mechanism of such learning — whether rumination facilitates or obstructs it, whether adaptation proceeds through oscillation between loss and restoration orientations, and whether certain grief complications represent learning failures or learning detours. The stakes are considerable: to frame grief as learning is to relocate it from pathology to development.