Embodied self-awareness occupies a distinctive and contested position within the depth-psychology corpus, standing at the intersection of neurophysiology, developmental psychology, somatic therapy, and phenomenological philosophy. Alan Fogel’s systematic treatment in Body Sense (2009) constitutes the most sustained theoretical elaboration, distinguishing embodied self-awareness — the felt, interoceptive apprehension of one’s internal states, emotions, and body schema in the subjective emotional present — from conceptual self-awareness, which operates through narrative, categorization, and reflective thought. For Fogel, embodied self-awareness is not a derivative or secondary mode of knowing but rather the ontogenetic and neurophysiological foundation of selfhood, present in rudimentary form from birth and shaped throughout life by relational experience and experience-dependent brain development. The corpus reveals productive tensions: between the spontaneous, pre-reflective character of embodied awareness and the deliberate practice required to recover it once suppressed; between its individual phenomenology and its irreducibly interpersonal conditions of emergence; and between the promise of somatic therapies to restore access to it and the neurological intractability of deeply entrenched suppression pathways. Gallagher’s phenomenological framework, while not employing the term directly, provides a philosophically rigorous account of pre-reflective self-awareness and body schema that situates Fogel’s clinical observations within broader questions of how bodily processes constitute — rather than merely accompany — conscious experience.