Conceptual self-awareness designates, in the depth-psychology and embodied-cognition corpus, a mode of self-knowing that operates through categories, narratives, propositions, and symbolic representations rather than through direct interoceptive or somatic feeling. Alan Fogel is the primary theorist in these materials, treating conceptual self-awareness as a necessary yet potentially problematic cognitive register: it furnishes autobiographical coherence, naming, and reflective judgment, but when it displaces embodied self-awareness it can function as a sophisticated defense, producing what Fogel calls ‘just-so stories’ that rationalize the avoidance of felt experience. The central tension in the literature is not between thought and feeling as simple opposites but between two modes of self-knowing whose integration—rather than the dominance of either—constitutes psychological health. Gallagher’s phenomenological work complicates this by situating conceptual self-knowledge as irreducibly second-order: to know oneself as believing or intending requires a theoretical posture, a reflective stance that is not built into primary experience. Damasio’s neuroscientific account adds further nuance, linking higher-order self-knowledge to autobiographical memory, working memory, and extended consciousness, all of which depend upon but also transcend the protoself. The concordance record thus reveals conceptual self-awareness as a site where somatic psychology, phenomenology, and neuroscience converge on a shared problem: the relationship between reflective cognition and lived bodily existence.