Across the depth-psychology corpus, ‘disposition’ occupies a conceptual crossroads between biological inheritance, psychological typology, and ethical character. The term resists reduction to any single register: in Stoic and Aristotelian frameworks it designates the non-occurrent structural readiness behind affective episodes — distinct from the affect itself yet organizing its emergence. Aristotle’s tripartite scheme of pathē, dunameis, and hexeis, examined closely by Cairns, reveals that aidos can function simultaneously as occurrent emotion and as settled dispositional state, a conceptual complexity that anticipates modern debates about trait versus state. Freud’s invocation of a constitutional ‘polymorphously perverse disposition’ lodges the term at the intersection of innate biology and developmental plasticity, while Jung and von Franz treat the ‘original basic disposition’ as the biological bedrock of typological introversion and extraversion, a bedrock that remains etiologically opaque even as its phenomenological consequences are richly mapped. The Stoics, as reconstructed by Inwood and Long and Sedley, configure disposition as a regulatory plan rather than a hydraulic drive — correcting, implicitly, the Freudian pressure-model. McGilchrist deploys ‘disposition’ at the level of hemisphere-specific orientations toward the world, extending the concept into neurological phenomenology. John of Damascus introduces a theological variant in which human dispositional variability is contrasted with the indivisible unity of divine will. The unresolved tension running through all these usages is whether disposition is primarily given (biological, innate, constitutional) or progressively formed through habituation and culture.