Boredom occupies a contested but increasingly significant position within the depth-psychology corpus, addressed across registers ranging from phenomenological philosophy to cognitive neuroscience to Jungian analysis. The dominant empirical current, represented by Danckert, Eastwood, and their collaborators, frames boredom as a self-regulatory signal — neither intrinsically pathological nor benign — that announces the failure of cognitive resources to engage meaningfully with available stimuli. This account distinguishes sharply between state boredom (an acute motivational alarm) and trait boredom (a chronic disposition toward regulatory non-fit), and it places the term in productive tension with concepts of meaning, autonomy, and goal pursuit. A philosophically richer counterpoint emerges in Byung-Chul Han’s cultural diagnosis: deep boredom, read through Walter Benjamin, is not dysfunction but the precondition for contemplative attention and genuine creativity — a capacity the hyperactive modern ego has forfeited. McGilchrist locates boredom’s historical emergence in the Enlightenment’s Cartesian devitalisation, reading it as a symptom of left-hemisphere dominance and the ‘withering’ of reality’s felt presence. Von Franz, working in the Jungian vein, connects boredom-adjacent states to the puer aeternus complex — procrastination, fantasy, and avoidance of genuine commitment. Pascal anticipates all of these positions in his account of divertissement: humanity flees boredom as it flees the thought of death. Taken together, the corpus reveals boredom as simultaneously signal, symptom, cultural formation, and — in its deep form — a potentially generative threshold state.