Attention occupies a peculiarly central position in the depth-psychology and cognitive-neuroscience corpus assembled here, functioning simultaneously as a neurological mechanism, a phenomenological stance, and a moral orientation toward the world. McGilchrist provides the most philosophically ambitious treatment, arguing that attention is not a neutral cognitive tool but an intrinsically relational ‘howness’ — a mode of being that constitutes the world it encounters, and that the two cerebral hemispheres enact fundamentally different kinds of attention, with the right hemisphere’s global, open attention taking precedence over the left hemisphere’s narrowly focused, instrumental gaze. Kandel approaches the term empirically, demonstrating that even ambient attention is necessary for the formation of stable spatial memory maps in the hippocampus, while LeDoux situates attention at the threshold of consciousness, arguing it is necessary but not sufficient for conscious experience. Bleuler’s clinical observations connect failures of active attention to the affective impoverishment of schizophrenia, and Janet documents attention’s role in restoring hysterical anesthesia. The ADHD literature (Rubia, Lin, Wynchank) treats attention as a dysregulated executive function modulated by catecholamines, prefrontal-parietal networks, and hormonal fluctuations. Across these registers, a persistent tension obtains between attention as selective filter and attention as world-constituting act.