Amnesia occupies a pivotal and contested position across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as a clinical symptom, a theoretical keystone, and a window into the architecture of selfhood. The literature divides broadly into two orientations. The neuropsychological tradition — represented by Sacks, Damasio, Kandel, and Siegel — treats amnesia as the diagnostic negative space through which memory systems are mapped: the celebrated case of H.M. revealed the hippocampus as the locus of explicit long-term encoding, while transient global amnesia and posttraumatic amnesia illuminate the temporal structure of consciousness itself. The depth-psychological and trauma traditions — Janet, Freud, van der Hart, Herman, and Lanius — treat amnesia not as organic erasure but as motivated or structurally dissociative absence: the gap that marks the site of overwhelm. Janet’s taxonomic precision (localized, selective, generalized, continuous, systematized) established the clinical vocabulary that DSM-IV would later codify. Freud identified hysterical amnesia as the cardinal symptom of repression, a ‘chain’ extending from recent provocations back to infantile experience. Van der Hart locates dissociative amnesia within the theory of structural dissociation of the personality, while the Lanius volume situates traumatic amnesia at the intersection of avoidant cognition, dissociation, and the contested recovered-memory debate. Sacks, meanwhile, explores amnesia’s existential dimension — what it means to be dispossessed of one’s biographical past. The central tension is irreducibly theoretical: is forgetting a failure of consolidation, an act of structural dissociation, or an expression of unconscious intention?