Traumatic memory occupies a central and contested position throughout the depth-psychology corpus, constituting one of the field’s most generative theoretical problems. From Pierre Janet’s foundational distinction between fixed idées fixes and fluid autobiographical narrative, through Freud’s observation of traumatic fixation, to the contemporary neuroscientific work of van der Kolk, Herman, Ogden, and the structural-dissociation theorists, the corpus consistently argues that traumatic memory is categorically different from ordinary memory — not merely in content but in form, encoding, and neurophysiological substrate. Whereas ordinary autobiographical memory is verbal, linear, and temporally situated, traumatic memory presents as sensory fragments, somatic intrusions, and affectless or hyperaffective replays that resist narrative integration. The major tensions in the literature concern the mechanisms of this difference: structural-dissociation theory (van der Hart) locates it in the bifurcation between Apparently Normal Parts and Emotional Parts; sensorimotor approaches (Ogden) foreground unresolved action tendencies and nonverbal imprints; neurobiological accounts (van der Kolk, Lanius) map hemispheric lateralization and hippocampal disruption; and recovered-memory debates (Lanius volume) interrogate the reliability and reconstructibility of traumatic recall. Across these positions, a shared clinical imperative emerges: traumatic memory must be integrated, not merely narrated, for genuine resolution.