Within the depth-psychology corpus, ‘Addiction as Regulation’ names a cluster of interlocking propositions: that addictive behavior is not primarily a moral failure or a simple neurochemical hijacking but a functional, if ultimately self-defeating, attempt to manage overwhelming affective states. The foundational voice here is Khantzian, whose Self-Medication Hypothesis locates the origin of substance preference in the addict’s need to regulate specific emotional pain — rage, depression, anxiety — through pharmacologically matched compounds. Flores extends this through attachment theory, arguing that affect regulation is constitutively interpersonal and that addiction fills the void left by disordered attachment bonds. Winhall radicalizes the framework by recasting addiction as ‘behavioural affect regulation,’ integrating Polyvagal Theory and the felt sense to map dysregulation on the autonomic nervous system itself. Maté provides the clinical phenomenology: early adversity produces deficits in the brain’s own regulatory architecture, making substances feel, to their users, like a correction rather than an indulgence. Garland’s neurocognitive account traces how unregulated affect and automatic habit-formation collaborate to maintain compulsive use. Across these positions a productive tension persists: whether regulation-seeking is best understood as a psychological strategy, a developmental deficit, a neurobiological adaptation, or an embodied survival response — a tension that drives both theoretical debate and divergent treatment philosophies.