Samuels Writes

If individuation means becoming the person you are, or were intended to be, this may well include all sorts of sickness and personal wounds resulting from accidental dispositions of archetypal factors and/or environmental disaster, as Guggenbühl-Craig has suggested (1980). Are we to say that an orphan cannot individuate? Or a paraplegic? Or a pervert? Just as the implication that the Self involves nothing but integration has been challenged, equivalent objections have been made to too pristine a definition of individuation.

— Andrew Samuels

Samuels is pressing on a concealed assumption: that individuation is a story of completion, of the person moving from fragmentation toward wholeness, the wounds healed, the orphan's missing parents restored in some symbolic interior sense. Guggenbühl-Craig's challenge cuts cleanly through that assumption — if your life includes permanent loss, constitutional damage, or a desire structure that no social fabric will ever fully hold, then a theory of individuation that defines itself by integration quietly tells you that you cannot become who you are. The orphan is already excluded from the syllabus.

What Samuels opens here is not just a theoretical correction but a diagnosis of where the pneumatic tendency saturates Jungian thought itself. Integration, wholeness, the Self as telos — these are spiritual categories wearing psychological clothes. They answer the soul's suffering with an image of eventual resolution, which is exactly what the soul most wants to hear and exactly what forecloses honest attention to what the wound is. The paraplegic, the pervert, the orphan — Samuels lists them not to champion marginality but to ask what a depth psychology looks like that does not secretly require the wound to become something else before individuation can proceed. That is the harder question, and it has no clean answer on offer here, which is precisely the sign that it is worth staying inside.


Andrew Samuels·Jung and the Post-Jungians·1985