Trust occupies a structurally central position in the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as a developmental achievement, a relational capacity, an etymological root, and a spiritual orientation. The range of treatments is wide. Erikson’s formulation—taken up by Herman, Flores, and others—anchors the term developmentally: basic trust is the first psychosocial attainment of infancy, and its disruption by trauma or dysfunctional family systems reverberates across the whole of adult relational life. In this register, trust’s restoration becomes the central therapeutic goal, inseparable from integrity. A second current, represented by Moore and Hillman, approaches trust through the psychology of faith and betrayal: real trust must contain the shadow of potential betrayal, and any trust that requires idealized guarantees betrays a puer psychology of primal omniscience. Estés extends this into the masculine psyche, identifying a self-healing spirit whose trust is not conditional on the lover’s behavior but rests on the certainty that wounds can be transformed. McGilchrist and Benveniste contribute a philological dimension—that truth and trust share a common Germanic root (treu), binding epistemic fidelity to relational loyalty at the level of language itself. The ACA literature, finally, treats trust as the hard-won outcome of twelve-step recovery: the group becomes the first reliable container in which hypervigilance can be set down and authentic relationship attempted. These strands converge on a common tension: trust is both fragile—readily shattered by betrayal—and, at a deeper level, constitutive of selfhood and society.