Transition occupies a structurally pivotal position in the depth-psychological corpus, functioning simultaneously as a phenomenological reality, a ritual category, and an intrapsychic event. Victor Turner’s foundational work establishes transition as the liminal phase proper — the threshold state set in binary opposition to fixed status — giving it sociological precision that later writers absorb and psychologize. Murray Stein extends the biological metaphor of metamorphosis (pupation, diapause) into a three-phase model of psychological transformation in which liminality names the transitional middle ground where established hierarchies dissolve before new forms consolidate. Marie-Louise von Franz insists that transition across psychological thresholds requires confrontation with the opposites, making the inner encounter a necessary condition rather than mere accompaniment. Edinger charts transition as a discrete step within the coniunctio sequence, locating it precisely within the architecture of individuation. Janusz and Walkiewicz bring empirical developmental psychology into dialogue with van Gennep and Turner, demonstrating that failure to complete transitions — remaining ‘frozen’ in a phase — generates psychopathological symptoms. Across the corpus, a central tension persists between transition as natural process (metamorphic, sequential, biologically grounded) and transition as requiring active psychological work: confrontation, suffering, symbolic recognition, and the willingness to relinquish prior form. The term thus bridges biological, ritual, clinical, and philosophical registers without settling comfortably in any one of them.