The depth-psychology corpus engages the Stoic tradition not as an antiquarian curiosity but as a living theoretical rival and interlocutor. Several distinct orientations coexist. Edinger reads Stoicism psychologically, arguing that Stoic thinkers mistakenly attributed qualities of the Self — autarcheia, self-sufficiency — to the ego, producing an inflation that the psyche itself must correct. This Jungian critique stands in productive tension with the more sympathetic reconstructions offered by Graver, Sorabji, and Nussbaum, who treat Stoic emotion theory as a sophisticated, clinically relevant account of the voluntariness of the pathē, the role of assent in constituting affect, and the transformative potential of philosophical therapy. Inwood’s philological work anchors the discussion in early Stoicism, tracing the precise mechanisms of impulse, assent, and rational agency in Zeno and Chrysippus. Sorabji places the Stoics as the driving force in ancient debate about emotion and peace of mind, while Nussbaum foregrounds Seneca’s therapeutic letters as instruments of soul-formation addressed to imperfect, non-Stoic interlocutors. The canonical text of Marcus Aurelius provides the tradition’s own self-presentation: virtue as the sole good, external circumstances as indifferent, and the ideal sage as self-sufficient. Running through all treatments is a productive tension between Stoic intellectualism — emotions as false judgements correctable by reason — and the psychological reality of involuntary affective responses that even the wise man cannot fully suppress.