Sight occupies a singular position across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as a physiological phenomenon, an epistemological category, and a metaphor for the soul’s relation to truth. The ancient sources establish the foundational tensions. Plato, in the Phaedrus and Republic, elevates sight as the most piercing of bodily senses while insisting that wisdom herself cannot be seen, reserving true vision for the purified intellect turned toward the Forms. Aristotle, in De Anima, anatomizes sight with precision—color as its proper object, light as its condition—yet already anticipates the problem of meta-perception: what sense detects the sense-organ of sight in the act of seeing? Plotinus deepens this aporia by arguing that genuine vision requires distance, that an imprint theory of seeing collapses into shadow-knowledge, and that the soul’s permeation of light reveals sight as analogous to intellectual union. Bruno Snell’s philological contribution is decisive for depth psychology: Homeric Greek possessed no single word for the function of sight as such, only relational terms encoding gesture, sentiment, and the quality of encounter between seer and seen. McGilchrist builds on Snell to argue that this pre-Cartesian sight was alive and bidirectional—observation as such, the detached unidirectional gaze, came later. The corpus thus maps a trajectory from participatory, affective vision to the abstracted theoretical gaze, with depth psychology consistently asking what has been lost in that transition.