Semblance occupies a philosophically charged position across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as aesthetic category, epistemological problem, and ontological veil. Nietzsche furnishes the most sustained and theoretically generative treatment: in The Birth of Tragedy, semblance is the very medium through which Apolline art redeems existence, the beautiful veil that renders life bearable precisely because it conceals the Dionysiac abyss beneath individuation. For Nietzsche, the drive toward semblance is not mere deception but nature’s own redemptive mechanism — a fervent longing immanent in artistic drives themselves. This Nietzschean axis converges with Schopenhauer’s intuition, cited approvingly, that all reality is itself semblance. The pre-Socratic strand, traced by Bruno Snell through Xenophanes and Parmenides, locates semblance (Greek dokos) as the epistemological condition of mortal knowledge — the necessary counterpart to divine clarity. Heidegger, in Being and Time, takes up semblance as a privative variant of phenomenal showing, the degraded form in which appearance becomes mere appearance. Schiller, via Abrams, elevates aesthetic semblance to a political and moral category — the realm in which freedom is rehearsed. Jung touches the term obliquely, noting how semblance-performances (intellectual display masking psychic need) sustain defensive structures. Across all these registers, semblance names the irreducible tension between surface-showing and concealed depth.