Sadness occupies a richly contested position within the depth-psychology corpus, refusing reduction to either simple pathology or mere affect. The corpus divides broadly into three interpretive strands. The first, represented most systematically by Karnaze and Levine (in Lench, 2018), treats sadness as an architect of cognitive and motivational restructuring — an evolved signal that, far from being passive, forces revision of beliefs and disengagement from unattainable goals following irrevocable loss. This functionalist strand draws a decisive distinction between adaptive sadness, which promotes reflective realism, and pathological rumination. The second strand, anchored in Bowlby’s attachment framework, situates sadness within the phenomenology of grief and mourning, attending to its suppression, displacement, and the clinical consequences of its inhibition. The third strand — present in McGilchrist, Moore, and Hillman — approaches sadness through a depth-hermeneutic lens, aligning it with melancholy, Saturn, the right hemisphere’s mode of knowing, and the soul’s encounter with loss and longing. McGilchrist’s neuropsychological argument that sadness and empathy are deeply correlated, and that both are right-hemisphere phenomena, gives this strand empirical purchase. Across all three, the key tension is whether sadness is to be moved through efficiently or honored as a necessary dwelling place of the psyche.