The Reflective Mind occupies a contested and generative position across the depth-psychology corpus, appearing at the intersection of neuroscience, psychoanalytic theory, contemplative psychology, and developmental attachment research. The term designates not a single faculty but a family of higher-order capacities: the ability to take one’s own mental states as objects of awareness, to mentalize the inner worlds of self and other, and to move beyond prereflective identification toward what Welwood calls ‘phenomenological reflection.’ Alcaro and Carta ground the reflective mind in neuro-ethological evolution, proposing that the ‘instinct’ of imagination constitutes its biological substrate. Siegel situates reflective function within attachment theory, showing how the capacity to perceive and represent mental states is transmitted interpersonally and instantiated in neural integration. Welwood introduces a vertical axis, arguing that psychological reflection is an indispensable but ultimately penultimate step—a transition zone between unconscious identification and the nondual presence of meditative awareness. Fonagy’s concept of mentalization, cited across several texts, threads through these positions as a clinical operationalization of reflective capacity. The central tension in the corpus runs between reflection as therapeutic achievement—something to be cultivated—and reflection as a structure to be ultimately transcended in favor of more direct, non-representational modes of presence. This productive ambivalence marks the term as one of the most theoretically alive in contemporary depth psychology.