Across the depth-psychology and humanistic corpus indexed in Seba, ‘realism’ operates on at least three distinct registers that only occasionally converge. In Auerbach’s monumental philological project, realism names a literary-historical achievement: the emancipation from classical style hierarchies that allowed everyday social life — in all its triviality, ugliness, and historical contingency — to be treated seriously, even tragically, in prose fiction. For Auerbach, modern realism is inseparable from the French nineteenth century (Stendhal, Balzac, Flaubert) and is fundamentally constituted by the mixing of styles and the embedding of characters within fluid historical movement. Barrett’s neuroscientific contribution introduces ‘affective realism’ as a cognitive-phenomenological category: the brain’s tendency to treat internally generated affective states as objective facts about the world, producing perceptions rather than neutral observations. This concept stands in productive tension with Auerbach’s aesthetic realism, since Barrett’s account undermines the very notional transparency of representation that literary realism presupposed. Heidegger’s treatment of the realism thesis appears obliquely, as a position to be interrogated rather than endorsed — the claim that an external world is ‘really present-at-hand’ — and is folded into his broader ontological argument about Being-in-the-world. Romanyshyn’s Jungian register adds yet another layer: the autonomous unconscious as a ‘sui generis reality,’ a figural realism of soul that challenges both positivist and purely constructivist accounts. These positions collectively map a field in which realism is always contested — aesthetic, affective, ontological, and depth-psychological variants pulling against each other.