Mimesis stands at one of the most contested intersections in the depth-psychology corpus: the question of how psychic and cultural life reproduce, transmit, and transform themselves through acts of likening, reenactment, and representation. The corpus reveals at least three distinct registers in which the term operates. First, in its classical Platonic sense — dissected at length by Havelock — mimesis names the dangerous psychic mechanism by which oral poetry colonizes the listener’s identity, compelling sympathetic identification rather than critical reflection; Plato’s ban is thus a psychological, not merely aesthetic, intervention. Second, in Auerbach’s monumental philological project, mimesis designates the entire history of serious literary representation of reality in Western letters, a project whose own method — personal, time-bound, non-systematic — mirrors the embodied contingency it traces. Third, in the somatic-imaginal tradition represented by Bosnak, mimesis resurfaces as a compulsive force underlying embodied imagination and the incarnation of psychic figures in therapy. McGilchrist’s neurological account of imitation and projective identification adds a fourth dimension: mimesis as a right-hemisphere-mediated interpersonal merging that precedes reflective consciousness. Jaynes introduces yet another register, linking mimesis to the collapse of bicameral divine utterance into conscious, laborious literary imitation. The tensions among these positions — mimesis as epistemological danger, as literary method, as therapeutic tool, as neural substrate — make the term a genuinely productive knot in any depth-psychological concordance.