Psychosomatic pathology occupies a contested yet generative space across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning as a convergence point where neurobiology, trauma theory, psychoanalysis, and somatic psychology meet. The literature refuses a clean separation between psychological and organic causation: Schore demonstrates how early relational failures dysregulate the orbitofrontal-limbic-autonomic axis, producing measurable immunological deficits and visceral pathology; Levine argues that unresolved traumatic activation—undischarged energy frozen in the nervous system—accounts for the preponderance of medically unexplained symptoms, estimated at up to seventy-five percent of primary-care presentations. Maté extends this line, showing how emotional suppression, grief, and chronic stress perturb neuroimmune pathways implicated in malignancy. Nijenhuis contributes the concept of somatoform dissociation, reframing somatic symptoms as structural dissociative phenomena rooted in defensive substates rather than conversion. A persistent tension runs through the corpus between mechanistic accounts—those tracing visceral pathology to cortisol dysregulation, parasympathetic excitation, or impaired orbitofrontal regulation—and more phenomenological or archetypal readings. Hillman, alone among these voices, interrogates the concept of pathology itself, warning that the disease framework, when applied unreflectively, suppresses the soul’s pathos. What unites these disparate perspectives is the shared insistence that the body is not a passive substrate but an active register of psychological history, relational wounding, and unmetabolized affect.