Polysemy — the condition of a single sign bearing multiple, related meanings — appears across the depth-psychology corpus in registers that range from technical linguistics to ontological philosophy and neuropsychological critique. Allan’s monograph on the Ancient Greek middle voice treats polysemy as the governing structural principle of a grammatical category: the middle voice is not a family of homonyms but a radially organised complex category whose distinct usage types share prototype-based family resemblances and extend outward through metaphorical and metonymic links. Ricoeur engages polysemy at the level of philosophical anthropology, arguing that the ‘grand words’ of ethics and politics — being, action, liberty, justice — are constitutively polysemic, and that this semantic plurality is not a defect to be overcome but the very condition that permits analogical unity across human experience. Hillman, by contrast, celebrates polysemy as the hallmark of metaphorical or imaginal consciousness: where logical discourse demands univocity, alchemical and archetypal thinking thrives on doublespeak and the inexhaustible resonance of images. McGilchrist situates polysemy neuropsychologically, noting that the left hemisphere treats it as noise and ambiguity to be eliminated, while the right hemisphere recognises it as intrinsic to the texture of natural language and lived reality. Benveniste’s historical-linguistic analyses demonstrate how polysemy accumulates diachronically through ritual, social, and institutional context. Together, these voices frame polysemy as simultaneously a structural, ontological, psychological, and cognitive phenomenon — one whose suppression marks a pathological narrowing of mind.