The term ‘phenomenon’ occupies a structurally pivotal position across the depth-psychology corpus, carrying substantially different valences depending on whether the author approaches from phenomenological philosophy, empirical psychology, religious studies, or natural science. Heidegger establishes the rigorous ontological baseline: the phenomenon in the ‘genuine primordial sense’ is precisely that which shows itself from itself, distinguished sharply from mere appearance or semblance — a distinction that reverberates through Thompson’s integration of biology and phenomenology, and through Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perceptual constancy. James, by contrast, treats the phenomenon as the irreducible unit of religious experience: events that ‘defy expression’ yet carry overwhelming noetic authority. Eliade insists that religious phenomena must be encountered as religious phenomena — not dissolved into psychological or sociological surrogates — and thus sets the methodological stakes for the historian of religions against the phenomenologist. Jung’s school extends the term into clinical territory: transference, hysterical cough, repetition in word-association — all are named ‘phenomena’ whose significance lies not in surface behavior but in the unconscious complexes they betray. Sardello, Ulanov, and Sardello each press further, asking whether the compelling agency felt within a phenomenon belongs to the individual psyche or to something genuinely transpersonal. The unresolved tension between phenomenological immanence and depth-psychological transcendence makes this term indispensable to the concordance.