The term ‘phantom’ appears in the depth-psychology corpus across two largely distinct but philosophically resonant registers. In the neurological and phenomenological literature, the phantom limb—the persistent felt presence of an amputated or congenitally absent member—serves as a privileged site for interrogating the relationship between body image, body schema, and consciousness. Gallagher, drawing on Merleau-Ponty, deploys phantom limb phenomenology to adjudicate between innate and acquired models of bodily self-representation, while Sacks catalogues the bewildering variety of phantom morphology first systematized by Silas Weir Mitchell. Merleau-Ponty himself treats the phantom as decisive evidence that neither pure peripheral nor pure central theories suffice: the phenomenon is irreducibly psychic, anchored in a being-in-the-world that refuses reduction. Fogel and Ramachandran’s mirror-box work extends this into therapeutic territory, demonstrating that visual-proprioceptive cross-modal interaction can dissolve phantom pain entirely. In a philosophically older register, Lorenz’s reconstruction of Aristotelian phantasia traces how imagistic representation mediates between perception and desire, forming the cognitive substrate of all purposive locomotion. The Hillman passages invoke the phantom as nocturnal visitation—the nightmare demon materializing through respiratory suppression. These strands, though heterogeneous, converge on a shared problematic: the phantom marks the place where subjective embodiment exceeds objective anatomy, and where psyche, image, and soma are most legibly entangled.