Personal Synthesis, as the depth-psychological corpus treats it, names the ongoing mental operation by which disparate experiential elements — perceptions, memories, action-tendencies, part-selves — are bound into a coherent, temporally extended unity. The term derives most systematically from Pierre Janet’s hierarchy of integrative mental actions, elaborated rigorously in van der Hart and colleagues’ structural-dissociation framework, where synthesis is positioned as the foundational act upon which all higher-order integration (personification, presentification) depends. Janet’s progeny insist that synthesis is not a static achievement but a continuum whose quality oscillates with mental energy and efficiency; when integrative capacity falters, dissociative symptoms emerge as the experiential world fragments across part-selves that synthesize incompatible stimulus sets. Sri Aurobindo approaches the same territory from a different quarter, framing individual synthesis as a limited conscious construction through which the Purusha organizes world-experience into the temporary utility of personality — a view that places personal synthesis within a metaphysical architecture rather than a clinical one. Rudhyar and the transpersonal current further distinguish generic individuation from the specifically personal process of integration, while Jungian voices (Samuels, Tozzi) locate synthesis in the dialectic between ego and unconscious that the transcendent function mediates. The central tension across the corpus is between synthesis as therapeutic technique (guided, phased, measurable) and synthesis as ontological condition — the very ground of selfhood.