The term ‘particular’ traverses the depth-psychology corpus along two intersecting axes: the ontological and the ethical-practical. Ontologically, the question is how the particular relates to the universal — how a singular being, event, or instance stands in relation to type, form, or law. Simondon argues with remarkable precision that the type belongs to the particular being rather than the reverse, making individuality irreducible to classification. Plotinus distinguishes two phases of Intellect, separating that which has no contact with particulars from that which unfolds into them. Aurelius reads the particular fate as a coherent expression of cosmic destiny rather than mere accident. The ethical-practical axis runs through Nussbaum’s reconstruction of Aristotelian practical wisdom: moral perception, she shows, is precisely the capacity to grasp the salient features of the concrete particular, a form of insight altogether different from deductive knowledge. Abram locates the particular in linguistic and ecological embeddedness — a language shapes not just thought but the very texture of sensory contact with a particular terrain. Across these traditions, the particular functions as both problem and solution: it resists reduction to abstract law while remaining the only site at which wisdom, individuation, perception, and fate become real.