The term ‘opinion’ (Greek: doxa) occupies a contested and philosophically charged position throughout the depth-psychology corpus, functioning not merely as a casual expression of personal preference but as an epistemological category with profound psychological consequences. The corpus reveals two broad streams of treatment. The first, anchored in Plato and elaborated by Havelock, constructs opinion as the cognitive condition of those who perceive only the flux of sensible particulars rather than eternal forms — a faculty intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, between being and non-being, and characteristically associated with poetic culture, unreflective acceptance of convention, and the crowd’s unreasoned assent. The second stream, developed by the Stoics as reconstructed by Inwood and Long-Sedley, refines opinion technically into a species of assent — specifically, assent given to impressions that are incognitive or false, with the ‘fresh opinion’ playing a decisive causal role in the generation of the passions. Fromm extends this critical lineage into social psychology, exposing how individuals internalize authoritative opinions while sustaining the illusion of autonomous thought. Aristotle complicates the picture by distinguishing opinion from imagination, science, and intelligence while leaving open the boundary between opinion and sensation. Together, these voices locate ‘opinion’ at the intersection of epistemology, psychology, and cultural critique — precisely where the depth-psychological tradition does its most searching work.
those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither… such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge
Plato establishes opinion as the cognitive condition of those who apprehend only sensory particulars, contrasting it sharply with knowledge of the eternal and absolute.
, Republic, -380thesis
opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties
Plato formally distinguishes opinion and knowledge as distinct faculties oriented toward ontologically different objects, grounding epistemology in a psychology of faculties.
, Republic, -380thesis
the passage is devoted to a formalisation of the relationship between knowledge on the one hand and opinion on the other and the definition of the gulf between them
Havelock argues that Plato’s attack on poetry is ultimately an attack on ‘opinion’ as the collective, unreflective cognitive state of Homeric culture.
, Preface to Plato, 1963thesis
In early classical Greek, doxa meant ‘opinion,’ but it gradually evolved to mean ‘approval’… The earlier meaning was ‘opinion,’ as something contrasted with truth and hence not highly thought of.
Edinger traces the semantic evolution of doxa from ‘opinion’ to ‘glory,’ revealing how the term’s original epistemological inferiority eventually transformed into a theological category of praise.
, The Psyche in Antiquity, Book One: Early Greek Philosophy From Thales to Plotinus, 1999thesis
the general characteristic of ‘opining’ is ‘assent to the incognitive’… Arcesilaus says ‘assent to the incognitive is opinion’
Long and Sedley reconstruct the Stoic-Academic debate in which opinion is technically defined as assent given to incognitive impressions, revealing a precise psychological mechanism underlying error.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987thesis
to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion… opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being
Plato’s divided line assigns opinion to the realm of becoming, systematically subordinating it to intellect and aligning it with shadows and appearances rather than being.
, Republic, -380thesis
He has the illusion of having arrived at an opinion of his own, but in reality he has merely adopted an authority’s opinion without being aware of this process.
Fromm exposes the pseudo-autonomy of modern opinion formation, showing how individuals unconsciously internalize authoritative views while fabricating retrospective reasons to claim independent thought.
, Escape from Freedom, 1941thesis
The most important fact about this fresh opinion is that… it does not refer primarily to a temporal recentness of the object about which the opinion is made, but rather to the fact that a fresh opinion is one which still has a certain kind of force for the agent.
Inwood clarifies the Stoic concept of ‘fresh opinion’ as an evaluative assent retaining psychological force, directly implicating it in the causation of the passions.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985thesis
it is a condition of opinion which accepts a constant wandering and contradiction in physical reporting; one which is alien to number and to calculation
Havelock characterises poetic opinion as a fundamentally unstable epistemic condition, structurally incapable of the consistency required by science or dialectic.
, Preface to Plato, 1963supporting
I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge is true opinion
Theaetetus proposes that knowledge is true opinion, a definition Socrates will subsequently interrogate, advancing the dialogue’s systematic inquiry into the boundary between opinion and knowledge.
, Theaetetus, -369supporting
he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions of all men are true
Socrates demonstrates the self-refuting character of Protagoras’ relativism, showing that the doctrine that all opinions are true necessarily validates the opinion that it is false.
, Theaetetus, -369supporting
the solution which has been given for the discrepancy between the opinion and the passion remains valid
Inwood argues that the persistence of a prior evaluative opinion accounts for the lag between the fading overt signs of passion and the underlying psychological state in Chrysippus’ theory.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting
The faculties in virtue of which we do this are sense, opinion, science, intelligence. That imagination is not sense is clear from the following considerations
Aristotle distinguishes imagination from opinion, sense, and intelligence as separate cognitive faculties, placing opinion within a graduated hierarchy of epistemic operations.
, On the Soul (De Anima), -350supporting
all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?
Plato asserts that even true opinions are epistemically defective without the rational grounding that intelligence provides, rendering them blind guides at best.
, Republic, -380supporting
how can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?
In the Philebus, Plato extends the question of truth and falsity from beliefs to affective states including opinions, treating evaluative assent as susceptible to epistemic error.
, Philebus, -360supporting
Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true being, and have no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty, truth, and that philosophers have such patterns
Plato’s summary of Book VI sets up the political consequences of the knowledge-opinion divide: governance belongs to those who transcend mere opinion and attain knowledge of forms.
, Republic, -380supporting
error or ignorance is essentially negative — a not-knowing; if we knew an error, we should be no longer in error
The Theaetetus introduction reflects on the difficulty of grounding false opinion psychologically, noting that pure ignorance cannot explain positive misidentification.
, Theaetetus, -369aside
if an assent is the cause of an impulse and they always occur together, it should not matter a great deal which is said to remain the same
Inwood explores the structural relationship between opinion-as-assent and impulse in Stoic action theory, noting their mutual implication within the general psychology of action.
, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985aside