The concordance 10 witnesses
Orientation
A word can travel from “opinion” to “glory” without ever shedding its instability. Edward Edinger traces this drift in doxa: “opinion” in early classical Greek becomes “approval,” then “praise,” until the New Testament crowns it as glory, a semantic career he reads as psychologically diagnostic. Marcel Detienne recovers the term’s harder archaic edge: in sophistic and rhetorical practice doxa was “sphalera kai abebaios,” fragile and unstable, forever exposed to Peitho’s power to substitute one opinion for another, kin to apate rather than aletheia. Eric Havelock pushes the contrast back to Homer, equating the Homeric state of mind itself with doxa, the poetic mentality Plato’s dialectic was built to overturn. Jacques Lacan, reading Diotima’s speech in the Symposium, finds in doxa a third position between knowledge and ignorance: true opinion whose holder cannot say why it is true, a structure he binds to love as giving what one does not have. Karen King, following Pierre Bourdieu, relocates doxa in the social field, where orthodoxy and heterodoxy fight over the boundary of what may be questioned at all.
doxa was fragile and unstable (sphalera kai abebaios); it would only sustain precarious positions. Functionally speaking, doxa was subjected to Peithô, which could substitute one doxa for another.
Detienne demonstrates that in sophistic and rhetorical thought doxa is constitutively unstable and subject to persuasive substitution, placing it in the semantic field of apate and ambiguity rather than aletheia.
, The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, 1996thesis
this intermediary which in the Platonic discourse, is called doxa, true opinion in so far no doubt as it is true, but in a way that the subject is incapable of accounting for it, that he does not know why it is true.
Lacan reads Platonic doxa as an intermediate epistemic state — true opinion without the subject possessing the logos that would ground its truth — and aligns this structure with the psychoanalytic formula of love as giving what one does not have.
, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference, 2015thesis
love belongs to a zone, to a form of affair, a form of thing, a form of pragma, a form of praxis which is at the same level, of the same quality as doxa, namely the following which exists, namely that there are discourses, ways of behaving, opinions — this is the translation that we give to the term doxa — which are true without the subject being able to know it.
Lacan explicitly equates love’s epistemic structure with doxa, defining doxa as the register of opinions and discourses that are true without transparent self-knowledge on the part of the subject who holds them.
, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference, 2015thesis
In early classical Greek, doxa meant ‘opinion,’ but it gradually evolved to mean ‘approval.’ In other words, if one has positive public opinion, then one is getting approval, which became ‘praise,’ and in more supreme form ‘glory.’
Edinger charts doxa’s semantic evolution from ‘mere opinion’ through ‘approval’ to New Testament ‘glory,’ using this trajectory to illuminate the psychological contrast between the phenomenal world and Platonic aletheia.
, The Psyche in Antiquity, Book One: Early Greek Philosophy From Thales to Plotinus, 1999thesis
the struggle is over the boundaries of doxa itself. As Bourdieu puts it: The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted.
King, drawing on Bourdieu, reframes doxa as the contested field of socially naturalized opinion whose boundaries are the real stakes of the conflict between orthodoxy and heresy.
, What Is Gnosticism?, 2003thesis
The term doxa has some interesting features also, and over time has gone through a change of meaning.
Edinger introduces the semantic analysis of doxa in relation to aletheia and lethe, framing its transformation across Greek periods as psychologically significant for understanding consciousness and truth.
, The Psyche in Antiquity, Book One Early Greek Philosophy supporting
state of mind, Homeric, 41, 46, 47; equivalent to doxa, 25 11
Havelock’s index entry equates the Homeric ‘state of mind’ with doxa, underpinning his argument that pre-Platonic mentality operates in the register of opinion and image rather than philosophical knowledge.
, Preface to Plato, 1963supporting
kleos, 23 115; cf. doxa
Havelock cross-references kleos (fame) with doxa, indicating their shared function as socially conferred recognition contrasted with stable epistemic grounds.
, Preface to Plato, 1963supporting
the passage contains no suggestion that phantasia is being distinguished from doxa, belief.
Nussbaum argues that Aristotle uses phantasia and doxa interchangeably in his analyses of emotion, treating both as forms of belief-like states rather than technically distinct mental categories.
, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994supporting
tvoofo (endoxo), 201 n.40. See also Doxa.
Detienne’s index cross-references endoxo (the reputable or well-regarded) back to Doxa, marking the semantic field connecting opinion, reputation, and social recognition in archaic Greek thought.
, The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, 1996aside