Within the depth-psychology corpus, ‘narrative mechanism’ names the functional, often neurobiologically grounded process by which the self constructs, maintains, and repairs coherent identity through story. The term bridges clinical, philosophical, and neuroscientific registers: Siegel treats it as the operative vehicle of integration, whereby autobiographical narration enacts the linking of differentiated mental states across time, rendering it foundational to psychological health. Ricoeur approaches the mechanism from the angle of emplotment—the formal operation through which character, action, and temporal sequence are synthesized into a coherent identity dialectic between sameness and selfhood. Frank, working at the intersection of illness and ethics, maps the mechanism’s breakdown and reconstitution: illness disrupts the narrative apparatus, forcing the ill person into reparative story-work that is simultaneously somatic, ethical, and social. Hillman interrogates the tacit genre-conventions that constrain the mechanism in therapeutic settings, arguing that therapists unwittingly impose epic, comic, detective, and realist modes onto material that resists such schematization. Damasio grounds the mechanism subcortically in somatic-marker processes that pre-select and highlight images prior to conscious narration. Sacks dramatizes its fragility: confabulation reveals that the narrative mechanism operates continuously and automatically, not only during deliberate reflection, making its disruption in Korsakoff’s syndrome a window onto its ordinary function. The central tension across these positions is whether the mechanism is primarily a cognitive-integrative achievement, a social co-construction, or an embodied, pre-reflective process.