Narrative identity stands among the most generative constructs in the depth-psychology corpus, drawing together ontological philosophy, developmental personality science, clinical theory, and phenomenology of illness into a single, contested field. The organizing claim — attributable in its most systematic form to Paul Ricoeur and adopted empirically by Dan McAdams and his collaborators — is that personal identity is not a substance or a set of stable traits but a temporal achievement: the concordant-discordant synthesis of a life emplotted as story. Ricoeur’s contribution, elaborated in ‘Oneself as Another,’ distinguishes the identity of sameness (idem) from the identity of selfhood (ipse), locating narrative as the indispensable mediating ground between these two poles. Jefferson Singer’s survey of personality research shows how empirical investigators have translated this philosophical insight into testable propositions about meaning-making, autobiographical memory, lifespan development, coping, and well-being. Arthur Frank extends the construct to the embodied domain, demonstrating that illness disrupts narrative continuity and that recovery requires storied reclamation of a body-self. Daniel Siegel’s developmental neuroscience reframes narrative identity as a dynamic, verb-like selfing rather than a fixed noun. Across the corpus, key tensions recur: between reductionist and constructionist methodologies, between sameness and selfhood, between narrative closure and the permanent openness of a life still in progress.