The depth-psychology and cognitive-science corpus treats ‘Mind As Emergent Process’ not as a settled doctrine but as a contested and productive theoretical frontier. The dominant voice is Daniel Siegel, whose Interpersonal Neurobiology framework advances a four-faceted working definition of mind as ‘an embodied and relational self-organizing process that regulates the flow of energy and information.’ For Siegel, mind is neither brain-bound nor individually owned; it arises from the dynamic interaction of nervous system and relationship, exhibiting the self-organization characteristic of complex nonlinear systems. Evan Thompson, drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Varela, and enactive cognitive science, deepens the ontological stakes: emergence here is ‘dynamic co-emergence,’ a dialectical process in which organism and world mutually constitute one another across biological, vital, and human orders. Thompson explicitly rejects the disembodied, cultureless symbol-processing model inherited from classical cognitive science. Iain McGilchrist contributes a parallel-processing account in which unconscious integration produces emergent patterns irreducible to serial, conscious computation. Arrayed against these process-relational positions is the dualist challenge, preserved in Panksepp’s citation of Penfield, who found neuronal action alone insufficient to explain mind. The term thus occupies the intersection of systems theory, phenomenology, neuroscience, and depth psychology, and carries direct clinical implications: impairments to self-regulation are reframed as impairments to self-organization, with therapeutic consequences for attachment, trauma, and developmental psychopathology.