Learning occupies a peculiarly contested position within the depth-psychology corpus. The behaviorist lineage—represented here most extensively by the Walker compendium shelved under James’s name—treats learning as an empirical phenomenon susceptible to rigorous operational definition: a change in behavior produced by reinforced practice, information processing, or neurophysiological plasticity. This tradition generates an elaborate taxonomy distinguishing procedural from cognitive learning, place from response learning, massed from distributed practice, and motor from verbal modalities. Against this systematic framework, Julian Jaynes mounts the most radical challenge: consciousness, he argues, is not merely unnecessary for much learning but actively inhibitory of it, suggesting that learning is better characterized as ‘organic’ than conscious. Eric Kandel situates learning within the neuroscience of synaptic plasticity, tracing the concept from Pavlovian excitability through Kornorski’s structural transformations to modern models of memory consolidation. Robert Sardello, by contrast, relocates learning from the laboratory to the ontological domain of soul, arguing that genuine learning ‘belongs to the very nature of living’ and that its abstraction into psychotherapy produces cultural iatrogenesis. These tensions—between mechanistic and phenomenological accounts, between conscious effort and organic acquisition, between neurological substrate and soul—constitute the generative fault lines through which depth psychology approaches this deceptively familiar term.