Memory occupies a central and contested position across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as a biological substrate, a phenomenological act, a therapeutic target, and a philosophical problem. The neuroscientific literature — dominated here by Kandel, LeDoux, and Siegel — treats memory as a tiered system: sensory registers feed short-term working memory, which in turn, through repetition and molecular consolidation involving protein synthesis, CREB activation, and synaptic restructuring, yields long-term storage in either implicit or explicit form. Brenda Milner’s landmark studies of H.M. established the hippocampus as the anatomical seat of explicit memory formation, while sparing implicit procedural learning — a dissociation that reorganized the field. LeDoux refines this taxonomy, insisting that implicit and explicit systems subserve fundamentally different conscious and nonconscious processes relevant to fear, anxiety, and psychotherapy. The trauma literature (Lanius, Ogden, Dayton) complicates the picture further: traumatic experience disrupts autobiographical retrieval through active inhibitory mechanisms and dissociation, not merely encoding failure. Philosophical and spiritual voices — Augustine, Aurobindo, Vernant — reframe memory as the condition of temporal selfhood, the device by which mentality apprehends its own succession across divided moments of time. William James’s original distinction between primary and secondary memory provides the historical pivot around which nearly all subsequent technical debates revolve.