Kinesthetic empathy occupies a productive but undertheorized position within the depth-psychology corpus, emerging at the intersection of phenomenological embodiment theory, somatic therapies, neuroscience, and intersubjective clinical practice. The term designates the capacity to feel, from within one’s own muscular and proprioceptive apparatus, the movement qualities, tensions, and bodily states of another person — a resonance that precedes and arguably constitutes the affective ground of empathic understanding proper. Across the corpus, several distinct but overlapping accounts present themselves. Koch and Fuchs ground kinesthetic empathy within an enactive embodiment framework, linking it to bidirectionality between motor and cognitive-affective systems and to Gallese’s concept of intercorporeality. Fogel approaches it clinically, demonstrating how a practitioner’s proprioceptive attunement to an infant’s stuckness generates spontaneous empathic speech. Levine theorizes somatic resonance as the indispensable substrate of therapeutic empathy, insisting that a therapist’s embodied attentiveness precedes and enables cognitive comprehension of a client’s state. McGilchrist situates empathic imitation in right-hemisphere phenomenology, distinguishing it sharply from mechanical copying through the concept of ‘inhabiting’ the other. Tozzi, drawing on Jungian active imagination, positions the kinesthetic sense as the only modality bridging conscious and unconscious, inner and outer — making movement itself an analytic instrument. The chief tension in the corpus runs between neurobiological reductionism (mirror-neuron accounts) and phenomenological irreducibility (the lived-body as medium of encounter), a tension that somatic clinicians tend to dissolve in practice without fully resolving in theory.