Within the depth-psychology corpus, ‘Invisible’ functions not as a simple negation of the visible but as a positive ontological category — the domain from which soul, daimon, archetype, and divine ground exert their formative pressure on visible life. Hillman’s treatment dominates the literature and is the most richly dialectical: he contests the assumption that invisibility is an intrinsic property of the suprasensory, proposing instead that what we call invisible may reflect the poverty of culturally conditioned perception, a ‘doctrinal blinding’ that forecloses certain modes of sight. Against this epistemological framing, Vernant’s classicist analysis reveals how Greek sacred art was organised precisely around the paradox of making the invisible visible — inscribing absence within presence, the other within the familiar. Giegerich approaches the invisible from a logocentric angle, declaring soul as such to be ‘invisible, intangible, and unknowable’ under positivist epistemologies, a situation that places psychological discourse in a structurally impossible but necessary position. Romanyshyn, drawing on Merleau-Ponty, reframes the invisible as the enabling medium of vision itself — not what is seen but the condition under which seeing occurs. Gnostic and theological sources (Meyer, John of Damascus) employ the term to characterise the ungraspable ground of divinity. Von Franz locates invisibility in fairy-tale symbolism as a figure for ego-transcending purposiveness. Across all registers the invisible marks the threshold between ego-consciousness and the encompassing depths it cannot directly occupy.