Innocence in the depth-psychology corpus is not a simple or stable category but a terrain of layered and often opposed meanings, the very multiplicity of which constitutes its analytical interest. The tradition distinguishes, with marked consistency, between at least two registers: a primary, pre-experiential innocence associated with naivety, undifferentiation, and the unexamined life, and a secondary, post-experiential innocence recovered on the far side of suffering, consciousness, and transformation. Edinger anchors the first register in alchemical symbolism, equating innocence with the prima materia and the undifferentiated state of pure potentiality. Hillman, treating the albedo, argues that the recovered innocence of the second whiteness is not inexperience but a condition in which one is no longer identified with experience. Woodman sharpens this into the contrast between a lower innocence destroyed by rape and a higher innocence conferred by ravishment and consciousness. Estés locates the distinction in the masculine psyche’s capacity for trust beyond wounding. The I Ching commentators — Wilhelm, Anthony, Liu I-ming — treat innocence as alignment with heaven’s will and the unconditioned mind. Masters, McGilchrist, and the Taoist commentators add the concept of second innocence as a spiritual attainment irreducible to its naive precursor. Giegerich alone reads certain invocations of innocence critically, exposing what he calls an illegitimate or obscene innocence in imaginal psychology’s refusal of historical consciousness. The tension between innocence as origin, innocence as goal, and innocence as ideological evasion is the productive nerve of the entire discussion.