The concept of human will occupies a contested and generative position across the depth-psychology corpus, traversing ancient philosophy, Christian theology, existential psychotherapy, and contemplative traditions. Albrecht Dihle’s historical scholarship establishes the foundational tension: whereas Greek thought subsumed volition under cognition — the Greeks possessing no single word for will as pure volitional act — the Biblical and Augustinian traditions elevated will to the primary locus of moral evaluation, responsibility, and the human response to divine commandment. Augustine’s synthesis, in which will becomes coextensive with all affective movement and is defined by its orientation toward or away from God, proved the pivotal transformation. Within existential psychotherapy, Yalom maps the clinical stakes: the eclipse of ‘will’ by ‘motive’ in psychoanalytic discourse has systematically absolved patients of responsibility, and the recovery of will — as ‘trigger of effort,’ ‘mainspring of action’ — is inseparable from the recovery of genuine agency and self-authorship. Easwaran, drawing on Upanishadic sources, reframes the problem through the relationship between desire and will, arguing that volitional energy is never absent but is habitually captured and redirected by desire. The neuroscientific challenge posed by Libet’s experiments haunts the entire discussion, suggesting that conscious volition may be an afterthought to neural preparation. The field thus holds in productive tension will as moral center, will as therapeutic lever, and will as possible epiphenomenon.