Volition occupies a contested and generative position across the depth-psychology corpus, moving between theology, classical philosophy, neuroscience, and legal theory. The ancient Greek tradition, as Dihle exhaustively documents, lacked a discrete term for sheer volition independent of cognition or emotion — the faculty had to be inferred through compounds of boulēsis, prohairesis, and thelein, each carrying intellectualist freight. It was Augustine, Dihle argues, who finally forged a concept of will as autonomous and primary, capable of standing apart from rational deliberation and thus enabling doctrines of grace, predestination, and moral responsibility that Greek ontology could not have sustained. John of Damascus carries this Augustinian inheritance into systematic theology, treating volition as co-extensive with nature: where natures differ, wills differ; where natures are shared, wills are identical. Epicurean physics, as Long and Sedley demonstrate, attempted to ground volitional autonomy in atomic swerve, asserting that volitions lack external antecedent causes without thereby being causeless. Contemporary neuroscience, in the figure of Barrett, complicates all such architectures by distinguishing volition — the brain’s actual causal role in behavior — from the phenomenal awareness of having chosen, warning that legal and psychological systems routinely confuse these. Together these voices reveal volition as a term whose apparent simplicity conceals the deepest tensions in any account of agency: between nature and freedom, between mechanism and responsibility, between cognition and desire.